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I. OVERVIEW

T

he Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant
the right “to be confronted with the witnesses against
him.”1 Often, the most formidable witnesses that
criminal defendants may face at trial are themselves.
The government may be expected to present, as evidence, all
confessions, incriminating statements, and damaging stray
remarks allegedly made by the defendant in preparation
for a crime, in its commission, in its concealment, and in its
investigation. Yet, in federal court, a criminal defendant’s right
to pre-trial disclosure of his or her own statements is severely
constrained. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(a) (“Rule
16(a)”) is laden with loopholes, and thus the court must undertake a complex inquiry with
regard to each such statement to
determine whether the prosecution bears a duty to disclose it.
Too often, the conclusion is that
no such duty exists.
Unlike many state court
discovery rules, 2 Rule 16(a)
requires the government to disclose only certain types of the
accused’s own statements, and
then only upon the accused’s
request.3 A criminal defendant
is not entitled to disclosure of
three broad categories of his or
her own statements.4 First, a defendant is not entitled to his or
her statements made to third parties, unless they were written
or recorded.5 Second, a defendant is not entitled to his or her
oral statements unless, at the time of making the statement, the
defendant: (a) knew he or she was speaking to a government
agent and (b) made the statements in response to interrogation.6
Third, a defendant is not entitled to his or her oral, written,
or recorded statements made to state agents prior to the commencement of a federal investigation or prosecution.7 Even if
the government is aware of these statements long before trial,
and even if disclosure compromises no aspect of the prosecution, Rule 16 does not require disclosure to the accused.
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If criminal defendants have a constitutional right to
confront the witnesses against them, shouldn’t this right
extend to their own incriminating statements? If the prosecution
is aware of a defendant’s damaging statements in advance of
trial, what values are protected by non-disclosure other than the
element of surprise? The statements are not the prosecutor’s or
government agent’s work product, and they are not privileged.
Unquestionably, the statements are not only often “relevant,”8
but frequently the most critical evidence against the accused.
Accordingly, full disclosure should be “dictated by the fundamental fairness of granting the accused equal access to his own
words, no matter how the Government came by them.”9
Although Rule 16(a) was intended to provide more liberal
discovery in criminal cases,10 its loopholes prevent criminal
defendants from adequately
preparing to confront the evidence against them at trial. The
loopholes may also inadvertently
provide an incentive for government agents to forego written or
recorded preservation of some
of the most damaging evidence
against the accused, thereby
diminishing its reliability. 11
Finally, nondisclosure may
entice government witnesses to
fabricate and embellish from the
witness stand—free, from any
concern that their own veracity,
poor recall, and motives will be exposed to the jury.
Because non-disclosure of a criminal defendant’s own statements is arguably unsupported by any legitimate public policy
concern, the rationale for Rule 16(a)’s byzantine loopholes is
difficult to discern. Ultimately, they reflect federal resistance
to the proposition that discovery in criminal cases advances the
fair, prompt, and inexpensive administration of justice.12
This Article examines the history of Rule 16(a), its current
provisions, and the policy considerations for and against modifications to the rule. It then suggests how Rule 16(a) should
be revised so that it produces the salutary effects of pre-trial
discovery, without compromising the investigation and prosecution of crimes.
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II. THE HISTORY OF FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(A)
A. THE 1944 ADOPTION: CODIFYING A LIMITED
PRACTICE OF DISCLOSURE
In 1944, Rule 16 was adopted against a backdrop of judicial
concern that discovery in a criminal case might be impermissible,13 and was not mandated by the Constitution.14 Some
courts, however, allowed the defendant to inspect his or her
own seized documents and property on the theory that, but for
the government’s seizure, these items would have been available to the defendant.15 “The entire matter [was] left within the
discretion of the court.”16 As originally adopted, Rule 16, titled
“Discovery and Inspection,” provided:
Upon motion of a defendant at any time after the filing
of the indictment or information, the court may order
the attorney for the government to permit the defendant
to inspect and copy or photograph designated books,
papers, documents or tangible objects, obtained from
or belonging to the defendant or obtained from others
by seizure or by process, upon a showing that the
items sought may be material to the preparation of his
defense and that the request is reasonable. The order
shall specify the time, place and manner of making the
inspection and of taking the copies or photographs and
may prescribe such terms and conditions as are just.17
There was no requirement that the government provide the
defendant with his or her own statements in any form.18

B. THE 1966 AMENDMENT: RECOGNIZING
A DEFENDANT’S PROPRIETARY INTERESTS
In 1966, Rule 16 was amended to permit, among other
things, disclosure of a defendant’s own written or recorded
statements and grand jury testimony.19 The rule did not limit
disclosure to statements made to a known government agent.20
It largely left the entire matter to the trial courts’ discretion:
Upon motion of a defendant the court may order the
attorney for the government to permit the defendant to
inspect and copy or photograph any relevant (1) written
or recorded statements or confessions made by the
defendant, or copies thereof, within the possession,
custody or control of the government, the existence of
which is known, or by the exercise of due diligence, may
become known, to the attorney for the government, (2)
[results of physical and mental exams]; and (3) recorded
testimony of the defendant before a grand jury.21
The 1966 Amendment followed a wake of criticism regarding the limited discovery allowed in a federal criminal case.22
Acknowledging that, “[t]he extent to which pretrial discovery
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should be permitted in criminal cases is a complex and controversial issue[,]” the Advisory Committee noted that most of the
recent legal literature had been “in favor of increasing the range
of permissible discovery.”23 The Advisory Committee further
observed that,“[d]iscovery of statements and confessions is in
line with what the Supreme Court has described as the ‘better
practice,’ and with the law in a number of states.”24
According to the Committee, “[f]ull judicial exploration
of the conflicting policy considerations” could be found in
four New Jersey Supreme Court cases: State v. Tune,25 State
v. Johnson,26 State v. Murphy,27 and State v. Moffa.28 The New
Jersey cases are instructive, as they reveal the slow accretion of
judicial recognition that disclosure of an accused’s own statements is not only fundamentally fair, but does nothing to tip the
prosecution’s hand or compromise its case.
In 1953, Tune examined whether a trial court judge abused
his discretion by permitting an accused to examine his own confession.29 In affidavits, the defendant’s attorneys averred that the
defendant could not recall what he said and claimed his confession was the product of prolonged questioning, the use of force,
and threats of violence, rendering the confession involuntary.30
The trial court authorized disclosure, observing that, “[n]o reasons appear for believing that the prosecutor will be hampered
in his preparation for the trial or that there will be a failure of
justice, or that the public interest will be adversely affected, if
the inspection of defendant’s confession is permitted.”31
In a four to three split, the New Jersey Supreme Court reversed, finding that the trial court’s approach placed an unfair
burden on the prosecution.32 It observed that the accused, rather
than his attorneys, must provide an affidavit that supported his
motion which could thereafter be used against him at trial. 33
The majority cited with approval the withering jurisprudence
of Judge Learned Hand, who described pre-trial discovery as
an attempt to mollycoddle criminal defendants whose guilt was
all but certain:
Under our criminal procedure the accused has every
advantage. While the prosecution is held rigidly to the
charge, he need not disclose the barest outline of his
defense. He is immune from question or comment on
his silence; he cannot be convicted when there is the
least fair doubt in the minds of any one of the twelve.
Why in addition he should in advance have the whole
evidence against him to pick over at his leisure, and
make his defense, fairly and foully, I have never been
able to see. . . . Our dangers do not lie in too little
tenderness to the accused. Our procedure has been always
haunted by the ghost of the innocent man convicted. It
is an unreal dream. What we need to fear is the archaic
formulism and the watery sentiment that obstructs,
delays, and defeats the prosecution of crime.34
5

The Tune majority begrudgingly recognized that a defendant’s own confession could hardly be regarded as the
work product of the prosecution.35 It also noted that one state,
Louisiana, mandated disclosure of an accused’s confession,
while “many other jurisdictions” allowed disclosure solely as a
matter of judicial grace.36 Concluding that “[t]o grant a defendant the unqualified right to inspect his confession before trial
would be to give him an opportunity to procure false testimony
and to commit perjury at the expense of society[,]”37 and noting
“long experience has taught the courts that often discovery will
not lead to honest fact-finding, but on the contrary to perjury and
the suppression of evidence,”38 the Tune court concluded that
the trial court’s disclosure order was an abuse of discretion.39
Not surprisingly, the Tune dissent pointed out that the
New Jersey courts had virtually no experience, much less
“long experience,” with discovery in criminal cases, and that
the same parade of horribles beginning and ending with perjury
was raised in opposition to civil discovery only to be shown,
by long experience, to be baseless.40 The dissent decried the
fundamental unfairness of denying an accused access to his or
her statements:
It shocks my sense of justice that in these circumstances counsel for an accused facing a possible death
sentence should be denied inspection of his confession
which, were this a civil case, could not be denied. . . .
In the ordinary affairs of life we would be startled at
the suggestion that we should not be entitled as a matter of course to a copy of something we signed, . . . [h]
ow possibly can we say that counsel for the accused
should be denied a copy in face of the affirmative findings by [the trial judge], certainly supported by what
was before him, that neither the public interest nor the
prosecution of the State’s case will suffer? . . . It is
said that the accused “better than anyone else knows
its contents” and that his representation to his counsel
that he does not is “unbelievable.” Even if that is our
belief, why are we to say that [the trial court’s] contrary conclusion was not reasonably founded? I should
think it was entirely reasonable for [the trial court] not
to disbelieve that assertion in face of the circumstances
under which the confession was taken, the “conversations” over five hours of the early morning and the fact
that it is not the accused’s composition but the “narrative” written down by the police officer. . . . To shackle
counsel so that they cannot effectively seek out the
truth and afford the accused the representation which
is not his privilege but his absolute right seriously imperils our bedrock presumption of innocence.41
Five years after Tune, in State v. Johnson, a chastened
New Jersey Supreme Court acknowledged that Justice William
6

Brennan’s dissent in Tune had been echoed by three law review
articles in their tacit conclusion that Tune had been wrongly
decided.42 Although purporting to follow Tune, the court
announced that it would “start with the premise that truth is
best revealed by a decent opportunity to prepare in advance for
trial[,]”,43 and that “[i]t is difficult to understand why a defendant should be denied pretrial inspection of his own statement in
the absence of circumstances affirmatively indicating disservice
to the public interest.”44
In addition to its departure from Tune, Johnson reflected
other major evolutions. First, the court acknowledged that the
accused’s own statements were likely to be the core of the
state’s case, and “[s]imple justice requires that a defendant be
permitted to prepare to meet what thus looms as the critical
element of the case against him.”45 Second, the court conceded
that it is “no answer to say that a defendant ‘must remember’
what he said” because “as every trial lawyer knows, witnesses
do not recall their statements with precision or detail.”46 Third,
the court refused to allow the specter of perjury to color its
decision, noting that “a defendant who will dispute a truthful
confession hardly needs a preview to aid him.”47 Finally, after a
criminal defendant makes an initial showing of need, the court
found the burden of persuasion should shift to the state, which
must demonstrate “extraordinary circumstances” in opposition
to disclosure.48

C. THE 1974 AMENDMENTS & 1975 ENACTMENT:
A SEA CHANGE WITH A TWIST
1974 and 1975 ushered in sweeping changes to the
discovery process in a criminal case, largely in response to
the American Bar Association’s (“ABA”) comprehensive
and influential Project on Minimum Standards of Criminal
Justice.49 The ABA’s House of Delegates’ “Standards Relating
to Discovery and Procedure Before Trial” served as the benchmark for the Advisory Committee’s discussions regarding
proposed amendments to Rule 16.50
The ABA described its proposals as “revolutionary” and
proposed “more permissive discovery practices for criminal
cases than [was] provided by applicable law in any jurisdiction
in the United States.”51 Noting that its recommendations were
unanimously approved, the ABA pointed out that “[w]hat united
the . . . Committee was the view that broad pretrial disclosure of
the prosecution’s case was the key to satisfying procedural objectives of overriding significance to criminal justice.”52 These
procedural objectives, in turn, were defined as the need to “lend
more finality to criminal dispositions, to speed up and simplify
the process, and to make more economical use of resources.”53
In the course of its recommendations, the ABA “reappraised” traditional grounds for opposing broad discovery and
concluded as follows:
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One, the advantages to the prosecution of surprise in
the relatively few cases going to trial, was deemed
an inappropriate consideration. Another, the fear of
subversion of law enforcement by perjury, tampering
with or intimidation of witnesses, or by premature
disclosure of the identity of informants or details of
ongoing investigations, was seen as a matter which
occurred in only a minority of prosecutions and thus
to be dealt with under the circumstances of particular
cases, rather than serving as a barrier to discovery in all
cases. Finally, the argument that some defense counsel
are untrustworthy was viewed as exaggerated or anachronistic, and in any event as a
matter more appropriately treated
as a bar disciplinary problem than as
a basis for deprivation of the values
of discovery to the system.54

a broader right of discovery to the defense is dependent upon
giving also a broader right of discovery to the prosecution.”60
Rather than with regard to an accused’s own statements,
the Advisory Committee and Congress settled upon a series
of loopholes and exceptions. The job of how to interpret and
harmonize them was left to the courts.61 Even the ubiquitous
term “statement” was not defined.62
The Advisory Committee opted for an approach that
limited disclosure to statements that fell within narrow exceptions, rather than the broad policy of disclosure advocated by
the ABA, even though it acknowledged that the United States
Supreme Court had observed that pre-trial disclosure of a
defendant’s statements “may be the better practice.”63 Indeed, it limited disclosure in the face of its own recognition of
the salutary effects of pre-trial discovery:

The Advisory

Accordingly, it proposed almost
unlimited discovery in a criminal case:
In order to provide adequate information for informed pleas, expedite
trials, minimize surprise, afford
opportunity for effective crossexamination, and meet the requirements of due process, discovery
prior to trial should be as full and
free as possible consistent with
protection of persons, effective law
enforcement, the adversary system,
and national security.55

Committee and

Congress approached
the expansion of
criminal discovery far
more gingerly than did
the ABA, and did so

As a result, contrary to a rising tide
of opinion that broad discovery in criminal cases advanced rather than impeded
the administration of justice, Rule 16(a)
became riddled with exceptions with
regard to disclosure of the defendant’s
own statements. Without imposing a straightforward quid pro
quo, it also conditioned broader disclosure by the prosecution
upon more extensive disclosure by the defendant.65
After the sea change in 1974 and 1975, only two amendments to Rule 16(a) have altered the scope of disclosure of an
accused’s own statements.

with a decided twist.

The ABA recognized that this
represented a sizable shift from the “grudging” approach to
disclosure reflected in the federal rules and would require
“disclosure of nearly everything, subject to certain narrow
exceptions as to the type of information and to certain safeguards
as they are needed in a particular case.”56 The ABA, however,
rejected the notion that the accused’s right to disclosure should
be conditioned upon his or her disclosures to the prosecution.57
The Advisory Committee and Congress approached the
expansion of criminal discovery far more gingerly than did the
ABA, and did so with a decided twist. They accepted many of
the ABA’s recommendations, including that disclosure should
be mandatory, not subject to a “good cause” requirement, and
accomplished by the parties with limited judicial intervention.58
However, they resisted any broader disclosure obligations
by the prosecution without a commensurate expansion of
the defendant’s discovery obligations.59 “The majority of the
Advisory Committee [was] of the view that the two—prosecution and defense discovery—are related and that the giving of
Criminal Law Brief

[D]iscovery contributes to the fair
and efficient administration of
criminal justice by providing the
defendant with enough information
to make an informed decision as to
plea; by minimizing the undesirable effect of surprise at the trial,
and by otherwise contributing to an
accurate determination of the issue
of guilt or innocence.64

D. THE 1991 & 1994 AMENDMENTS:
A SMALL STEP FORWARD
With regard to written or recorded statements of the
defendant, the 1991 Amendments to Rule 16 eliminated the
requirement that conditioned disclosure upon the prosecution’s intention to offer the statement at trial.66 “The change
recognizes that the defendant has some proprietary interest
in statements made during interrogation regardless of the prosecution’s intent to make any use of the statements.”67 The revised
rule also required the government to produce, upon the defendant’s request, “that portion of any written record containing the
7

substance of any oral statement” made by the defendant during
interrogation.68 Finally, the revised rule compelled the prosecution
to produce any relevant oral statement by the defendant that it
intends to use at trial, even if only for impeachment.69
Through its broad definition of “defendant,” the 1994
Amendments clarified that disclosure obligations run to
and from organizational defendants.70 They also recognized
that an organization may be bound by its agents’ statements
and is entitled to the prosecution’s disclosure of all statements
which the prosecution contends may be attributable to the
organization’s agents.71
Together, the 1991 and 1994 Amendments reflect the most
recent revisions to Rule 16(a)’s disclosure obligations insofar
as they pertain to the defendant’s own statements.

III. EXAMINING FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(A)’S LOOPHOLES
Rule 16(a) imposes upon the government an obligation
to disclose three types of statements by the accused upon his
or her request: (1) oral statements made to known government
agents in response to interrogation; (2) written and recorded
statements known to the government and in its possession,
custody, or control; and (3) grand jury testimony.72 All three
categories require the statements to be “relevant.”73 All three
categories contain loopholes.74

A. ORAL STATEMENTS MADE TO KNOWN
GOVERNMENT AGENTS
Under Rule 16(a), the government must disclose, upon
the defendant’s request, “the substance of any relevant oral statement made by the defendant, before or after arrest, in response to
interrogation by a person the defendant knew was a government
agent if the government intends to use the statement at trial.”75
Accordingly, the prosecution’s disclosure obligation requires
the presence of seven “triggers,” each of which presents a corresponding loophole.76
First, the defendant must request the statement.77 Second,
the statement must be “relevant.”78 Third, the defendant must
make the statement either before or after arrest, and—at least
arguably—not during.79 Fourth, the defendant must make the
statement in response to “interrogation.”80 Fifth, a “government
agent” must initiate the “interrogation.”81 Sixth, the defendant
must know the government agent is a “government agent.”82
Finally, the government must intend to use the statement at trial.83
Rule 16(a) does not define the term “government agent.”84
In the course of drafting this loophole, no explanation was given
for requiring the statements to be given to a known government
agent.85 The courts typically define a “government agent” as
a person employed by or acting on behalf of a federal agency
after a federal prosecution or investigation has commenced.86
8

Rule 16(a) thus arguably exempts from disclosure an accused’s
statements made to state, municipal, and local law enforcement
officers.87
Pursuant to the plain language of Rule 16(a), the term
“government agent” is not limited to those working on behalf
of the federal government. Moreover, this imputed limitation
is capable of working a senseless injustice. As the Griggs
court observed:
We are constrained to note, however, the fundamental
unfairness which the operation of Rule 16(a)[ ] works
in this case. If [the defendant] had made his statement
to a DEA agent or an FBI agent [instead of a Pennsylvania state trooper], . . . it would be discoverable
. . . . [T]his defendant is not entitled under Rule 16
to discovery material which would be available to
other defendants in similar situations, with the only
difference being the employer of the person to whom
a statement is given. That is, another defendant may
be arrested in the same manner as [the defendant], be
charged with the same crime as [the defendant], give
the same statement in response to the same questions
during interrogation, and have the arresting agent take
the same notes, and yet the notes are discoverable in
one case and not the other.88
Nor does Rule 16(a) define the term “interrogation.”89
Courts typically define the term in accordance with Rhode
Island v. Innis90 to refer “not only to express questioning, but
also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than
those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police
should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating
response from the suspect[.]”91 Accordingly, the government
is not required to disclose an accused’s spontaneous oral
statements, no matter how incriminating.92
Finally, Rule 16 fails to define the term “statement,” leaving
the “development of a definition to the courts on a case-by-case
basis.”93 In summary, in addition to grappling with undefined
terms, a court must find all seven “triggers” present in order
to find a duty to disclose. As a result, many of an accused’s
most incriminating statements that are indisputably the product
of government initiated interrogation are immune from pre-trial
discovery. In addition, at least one circuit has expressly held
that the Rule 16(a) requires a written record of a defendant’s
oral statement made to a known government agent as a further
precondition to disclosure, even though the appellate court
acknowledged that Rule 16(a) does not expressly impose this
requirement.94 Rule 16(a) thus exempts from disclosure a vast
array of oral statements made by criminal defendants, regardless
of their evidentiary value to either side.95
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B. DEFENDANT’S WRITTEN OR RECORDED STATEMENTS
Under Rule 16(a), the government must disclose, upon
the defendant’s request, three categories of written or recorded
statements by the defendant.96 The first category is “any relevant
written or recorded statement by the defendant, if: [1] the statement is within the government’s possession, custody, or control;
and [2] the attorney for the government knows—or through
due diligence could know—that the statement exists[.]”97 For
such statements, there is no requirement that the statements be
intended for use at trial. There is also no requirement that the
statements be the product of interrogation by a known government agent.98 Finally, “[t]he right of a defendant under Rule 16
to his own recorded statements is presumptive . . . [and] [h]e
need not show that the statements are material or exculpatory.”99
Rule 16(a)’s second category of disclosure for written or
recorded statements pertains to that “portion of any written
record containing the substance of any relevant oral statement
made before or after arrest if the defendant made the statement
in response to interrogation by a person the defendant knew was
a government agent[.]”100 Accordingly, this provision of the rule
requires: (1) a written record; (2) containing the substance of an
oral statement; (3) made before or after an arrest; (4) in response
to interrogation; (5) by a government agent; and (6) whom
the defendant knew to be a government agent.101 Disclosure
is further cabined by Rule 16(a)’s overarching relevancy
requirement.102 By its terms, this provision of Rule 16(a) does not
require the statements to be known to the attorney for the government, or within the government’s possession, custody, or control.103
The rule also arguably does not require disclosure of statements
made during arrest, even if they are written or recorded.
The courts are not in agreement as to what types of “written
records” are covered by the rule.104 Practitioners appear to take
equally divergent approaches, causing one court to illustrate the
number of ways the rule is circumvented:
The language of Rule 16 plainly, and unambiguously,
requires the production of any handwritten notes of
government agents containing the substance of anything
said by the defendant during interrogation. Notably, the
rule requires disclosure of “any written record” containing “the substance of any relevant oral statement.” It is
thus not limited to a typed, formalized statement. It is
not limited to a verbatim or near-verbatim transcription.
It is not limited to the clearest, most readable version of
the defendant’s statement. Nor does the rule contain any
limitations on the nature of the statement (for example,
that it be exculpatory) or its intended use (for example,
that the government intends to use it at trial), other than
the command that it be “relevant.”105
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Other courts have required the production of a record
containing the accused’s statements, but not every record,106
even where there are minor discrepancies between the agent’s
handwritten notes and his or her report.107 Still other courts
have imposed requirements that have no arguable basis under
Rule 16(a).108
With regard to an accused’s oral and written statements,
Rule 16(a) provides a labyrinth of triggers and loopholes
requiring prosecutors, defense counsel, and courts to carefully
parse whether disclosure is required for reasons that have little
to do with the use of the statement, its materiality, the ease of
disclosure, and its facilitation of a fair and just resolution of the
case. Indeed, Rule 16(a)’s exceptions preserve the potential for
unfair surprise at trial with no corresponding gain.109

C. DEFENDANT’S GRAND JURY TESTIMONY
The final category of recorded or written statements required to be disclosed is refreshingly straightforward and unambiguous: “the defendant’s recorded testimony before a grand
jury relating to the charged offense.”110 As defendants who do
not plan to cooperate with the government rarely testify before
grand juries, such disclosures are relatively rare. However, in
the event of cooperation, disclosure of grand jury testimony
frequently proves useful as it may be used in plea negotiations
to provide a factual basis for a plea.111 It is also useful at sentencing to determine drug quantities and other disputed factual
issues and to establish the extent of a defendant’s cooperation
and substantial assistance to the government.112 Apparently, no
court has found the burden upon the government imposed by
this portion of the rule either onerous, unreasonable, or unfair.
Having examined Rule 16(a)’s loopholes, their history and
derivation, and how the courts have struggled to interpret and
implement them, this Article next examines whether there is a
legitimate explanation for their continued existence.

IV. REVISITING DISCLOSURE
A. PRAGMATIC CONSIDERATIONS
The first question to be answered in revisiting Rule 16(a)’s
loopholes is “Why now?” From a purely pragmatic perspective, the present is a perfect time for undertaking this effort. The
federal government’s correctional facilities are overburdened
and underfunded.113 The judicial branch, like all branches of
government, is struggling with budget cuts in the face of
increasing demands for its services. Federal judicial vacancies
are being filled at a desultory pace, with some districts operating continuously in crisis mode.114 U.S. Attorney’s Offices
and Federal Public Defender’s Offices are subject to a hiring
freeze.115 Despite all of this, crime marches on. Any mechanism
9

When considering the disclosure of an accused’s own statements,
the pragmatic advantages of more complete disclosure are even more
compelling. Criminal defendants who are confronted with their
statements as potential evidence against them are in a much better
position to weigh the advantages and disadvantages of a negotiated
plea and the risks and benefits of going to trial.
that speeds the processing of a criminal case without sacrificing
the quality of the administration of justice should be explored.
Here, the courts and commentators are in universal accord
that pre-trial discovery aids in the prompt and just resolution
of criminal cases.116 Indeed, over forty years ago, this was the
primary rationale for the ABA’s advocacy in favor of a policy of
virtually unlimited pre-trial prosecutorial disclosure.117
When considering the disclosure of an accused’s own statements, the pragmatic advantages of more complete disclosure are
even more compelling. Criminal defendants who are confronted
with their statements as potential evidence against them are in a
much better position to weigh the advantages and disadvantages
of a negotiated plea and the risks and benefits of going to trial.
Having seen the strengths of the government’s case against them
through such expanded pre-trial disclosure, criminal defendants
might be more likely to engage in more meaningful and timelier
plea negotiations. It will also better ensure that such negotiations
are the product of a fully informed decision, thereby reducing
requests to vacate a plea, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, or efforts to seek post-conviction relief as the result of a late
discovered discovery violation.
If plea negotiations are not successful, disclosure assists
in flagging evidentiary issues before trial. The parties will then
be able to fully brief those issues prior to trial. If an evidentiary
hearing is required, the court may set it in a timely manner
without carving into trial time. Disclosure also assists in more
effective cross-examination. “And probably no one, certainly no
one experienced in the trial of lawsuits, would deny the value of
cross-examination in exposing falsehood and bringing out the
truth in the trial of a criminal case.”118 More expansive pre-trial
disclosure of a defendant’s own statements thus furthers the
very objectives for which Rule 16(a) was promulgated:
Rule 16’s mandatory discovery provisions were
designed to contribute to the fair and efficient administration of justice by providing the defendant with
10

sufficient information upon which to base an informed
plea and litigation strategy; by facilitating the raising of objections to admissibility prior to trial; by
minimizing the undesirable effect of surprise at trial;
and by contributing to the accuracy of the fact-finding
process.119
Courts that discount these pragmatic considerations often
grossly understate the disruption that inevitably occurs when
a prosecutor fails to disclose an accused’s statement pre-trial
and later uses the statement at trial. At a minimum, the court
must generally stop the presentation of evidence and hear from
both sides outside the presence of the jury. The court must
then ascertain the nature and content of the statement in question, the circumstances in which it was made and to whom, its
materiality, and any prejudice. It must thus analyze the byzantine contours of Rule 16(a) and decide whether, when, and how
the government should have disclosed it. It must also analyze
whether there are other grounds for disclosure. In the majority
of criminal cases, the Brady doctrine, set forth in Brady v.
Maryland,120 the Jencks Act,121 Giglio v. United States,122 and Rule
16 “exhaust the universe of discovery to which the defendant is
entitled.”123 Thereafter, the court must make the necessary factual
findings and conclusions of law regarding whether disclosure was
required and by what rule or law. Properly performed, this is a
time-consuming and painstaking process.
If the court determines that disclosure was mandated by
Rule 16(a) or some other requirement of law, the court must
then decide whether to grant a continuance, declare a mistrial,
hold a suppression hearing if that is requested, impose sanctions, give a curative instruction,124 or proceed by finding no
prejudice. Rule 16(a) provides no guidance in determining how
this analysis should proceed, and further complicates the inquiry
by failing to define critical terms, leaving such definitions to a
highly divergent and ever changing body of case law.
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or by permitting disclosure in the nation’s state courts while
prohibiting it in its federal courts.
Finally, there are few—if any—countervailing public
policies served by nondisclosure. As the Ninth Circuit observed
over forty years ago:

Post-conviction, a new trial will be ordered to cure a
discovery violation only upon a showing of “substantial
prejudice.”125 Arguably, Rule 16(a)’s loopholes incentivize
non-disclosure.
In summary, nonchalant observations that “[s]urprising
moments and unexpected statements made from the witness
stand are par for the course in any trial, and even more so in
a relatively lengthy criminal proceeding,”126 substantially
understate the disruption caused by untimely disclosures, the
complexity of the court’s task at trial when the issue arises, and
the enormity of the prejudice the accused inevitably experiences
when he or she is confronted, for the first time, with his or
her own materially incriminating statements. Rule 16(a) is thus
unnecessarily difficult to interpret, inconsistently and arbitrarily
implemented, and, if not followed, the ensuing prejudice is
almost impossible to cure. From a purely pragmatic standpoint,
this is an opportune time to eliminate its loopholes.

Broad pre-trial discovery is the rule in civil cases.136
Fundamental fairness supports equally broad pre-trial discovery
with regard to a criminal defendant’s own statements. There is
no rational justification for a contrary approach.137

B. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

C. JUDICIAL UNIFORMITY

A criminal defendant has a near absolute right “to be
confronted with the witnesses against him.”127 In Pointer, the
United States Supreme Court held “that the right of an accused
to be confronted with the witnesses against him must be determined by the same standards whether the right is denied in a
federal or state proceeding[.]”128 This is pointedly not the case
with regard to a criminal defendant’s own statements. Many
states have long required the disclosure of the accused’s own
statements,129 while federal courts limit disclosure to only those
statements that make it through the gauntlet of Rule 16(a)’s
loopholes.130 An equal opportunity for pre-trial discovery in
state and federal court reflects society’s commitment to afford
fundamental fairness to criminal defendants regardless of the
forum in which they are prosecuted.
“Fundamental fairness” also requires heightened procedural
safeguards when the information in question is “material in the
sense of a crucial, critical, [or] highly significant factor.”131 It is
hard to conceive of information that is more “crucial, critical, or
highly significant” than the accused’s own statements that tend
to prove that he or she committed the offense charged.132 As the
United States Supreme Court has observed:

Rule 16(a)’s loopholes should be eliminated for the
additional reason that the federal courts have demonstrated a
marked inability to apply them uniformly. The rule was intended to minimize judicial intervention in pre-trial discovery.138
The abundance of case law attempting to harmonize the rule’s
various permutations suggests that this has not been the case.
Almost four decades ago, the Advisory Committee
explained that “[t]he rule is intended to prescribe the minimum amount of discovery to which the parties are entitled.
It is not intended to limit the judge’s discretion to order broader
discovery in appropriate cases.”139 Courts, however, disagree
regarding the permissible degree of departure from Rule 16(a)’s
express terms.140
Courts are deemed to have the inherent authority to order
expanded criminal discovery and to alter the timelines for existing discovery obligations.141 Rule 16 provides that a court “may,
for good cause, deny, restrict, or defer discovery or inspection,
or grant other appropriate relief.”142
The circuits are divided in determining whether a court
may order prosecutorial disclosures beyond the confines of
Rule 16(a). The Third Circuit has held that Rule 16 and various
federal statutes identify what is discoverable in a criminal case,
and that a court has no authority to expand disclosure beyond
them unless the failure to do so would violate Due Process.143
The Ninth Circuit has taken a similar approach,144 as has the
Sixth Circuit.145
In contrast, the Fifth Circuit has held that a district court
may take actions which are “reasonably useful to achieve justice” using its “supervisory powers” to “formulate procedural
rules not specifically required by the Constitution or Congress
. . . to preserve judicial integrity by ensuring that a conviction
rests on appropriate considerations validly before a jury.”146

A confession is like no other evidence. Indeed, ‘the
defendant’s own confession is probably the most probative and damaging evidence that can be admitted
against him. . . . [T]he admissions of a defendant come
from the actor himself, the most knowledgeable and
unimpeachable source of information about his past
conduct.’133
It borders on flippant to justify non-disclosure by asserting
that the defendant must already know what he or she said,134
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When a person is attempting to discover his own statements some of the reasons for not allowing discovery
are eliminated. There is no danger to government informants; there is no fishing expedition; there is no unfairness in giving the defendant the right to discovery
(a right not available to the government because of the
Fifth Amendment)[.]135
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The courts are equally divided on the issue of how to
address a Rule 16(a) violation once it has occurred.147 The
options, all undesirable, include taking a recess during the trial
to hold a hearing on the lack of disclosure,148 prohibiting the
government’s use of the statement at trial (assuming it has not
already been revealed to the jury),149 giving a curative instruction if it has, granting a continuance, declaring a mistrial, or
doing nothing.150
Appellate review is plagued with a similar selection of
undesirable choices as appellate courts are forced to speculate
as to how a trial may have been different if disclosure took
place in accordance with the rule.151 Rivera,152 is instructive.
There, the government failed to disclose, until the first day of
trial, the defendant’s statement to a customs inspector that a
cocaine-laden suitcase belonged to the defendant.153 Although
the appellate court recognized the importance of the statement,
it placed the burden of proof on the defendant, faulted defense
counsel for failing to anticipate the statement’s existence, and
found no reason for reversal of the defendant’s conviction.154
The Eleventh Circuit explained:
In order for this court to reverse a conviction based
on the government’s violation of a discovery order, a
defendant must demonstrate that the violation prejudiced his substantial rights. Substantial prejudice is
established when the defendant shows that he was
unduly surprised and did not have an adequate opportunity to prepare a defense or that the mistake had a
substantial influence on the jury. After a review of the
record, we find that Rivera has failed to establish either
of these requirements.
We do not believe that Rivera could have been
surprised by [the inspector’s] testimony that Rivera
had verbally claimed ownership of his suitcase, . . . In
a trial in which all the issues revolved around whether
the defendant[] knowingly possessed a cocaine-laden
suitcase, it is doubtful that Rivera’s counsel would
not anticipate or contemplate that such a statement
might exist. In addition, the belated disclosure of [the
inspector’s] testimony involved Rivera’s own statement which he should have had some knowledge of
making. More importantly, if Rivera had, in fact, been
prejudiced by the delayed disclosure of this statement,
he should have moved for a continuance. Rivera, however, did not do so and elected to proceed to trial.155
The error thus appeared to lie in the defense’s lack of
preparation, rather than the prosecution’s lack of disclosure.
Such an approach renders a disclosure obligation close to
meaningless, even when it pertains to the most critical evidence
at trial.
12

Because of a lack of judicial uniformity, criminal defendants in federal court have disparate rights to crucial pre-trial
discovery which may have a direct and irremediable impact
on the outcome of their cases. A simple and expansive rule of
pre-trial disclosure of an accused’s own statements would
promote judicial uniformity, ensure all criminal defendants
in federal court are afforded the same procedural rights, and
eliminate disparities between state and federal practice which
have no discernible basis in either logic or public policy.

D. PROSECUTORIAL UNIFORMITY AND INCREASED
PROFESSIONALISM
Simple, straightforward, and broad disclosure obligations
provide an incentive for law enforcement to document evidence
of a crime, including the often critically important statements
of an accused. Documentation and preservation of an accused’s
statements by government agents enhances reliability of those
statements at trial, making them less dependent upon the
vagaries of memory, less prone to alteration in the face of
trial pressures, and better tested through meaningful crossexamination as the result of pre-trial investigation. No rule of
criminal procedure should reward lack of documentation as
a trade-off for surprise at trial. As the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals observed:
The right at stake . . . is defendant’s discovery of
evidence gathered by the Government, evidence
whose disclosure to defense counsel would make the
trial more a “quest for truth” than a “sporting event.”
This safeguard of a fair trial is surely an important
one; but here it was undercut at the pretrial period by
bureaucratic procedures and/or discretionary decisions
of Government investigative agents who made no
effort to preserve discoverable material.156
Anything that encourages professionalism and preservation
of evidence at the investigative stage enhances the likelihood
that a prosecution that unfolds thereafter will be based upon
reliable evidence.
In turn, prosecutors who are tasked with a policy of broad
disclosure of an accused’s statements will gather and produce
them at a time when they are more likely to be the product of
accurate recall and less likely to be tainted by bias. Through
full disclosure, prosecutors also immunize themselves from accusations of misconduct and potential sanctions and eliminate
the need for judicial intervention in discovery disputes.157 A
criminal defendant’s right to discover his or her statements prior
to trial is thus likely to enhance the evidentiary value of those
statements while safeguarding the defendant’s right to fully
confront them at trial.
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E. PROPOSED REVISION TO FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(A)
A revision to Rule 16(a) that requires the prosecution
to disclose, pre-trial, all statements of the defendant in the
government’s possession, custody, or control renders both the
prosecution’s and the court’s task simple. It also provides a
criminal defendant with the information necessary to engage
in effective plea negotiations or prepare for trial. As currently
drafted, Rule 16(a)’s loopholes transform what was intended
to improve the quality and timeliness of the administration of
criminal justice into a series of obstacles a defendant must be
overcome in order to discover his or her own statements. “There
is something especially repugnant to justice in using rules of
practice in such a manner as to debar a prisoner from defending himself, especially when the professed object of the rules
so used is to provide for his defence.”158 The time to revisit
Rule 16(a)’s loopholes is now. Rule 16(a)’s loopholes do not
further any governmental interest that may not be safeguarded
in a more effective manner. It is time to eliminate them in order
to achieve a more fair, efficient, and uniform administration
of justice.

U.s. Const. amend. VI. (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State
and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district
shall have been previous ascertained by law, and to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.”).
2
See, e.g., ariz. r. Crim. P. 15.1 (requiring prosecution to disclose
defendant’s recorded statements no later than thirty days after arraignment);
ill. sUP. Ct. r. 412(a)(ii) (ordering prosecution to disclose “any written
or recorded statements and the substance of any oral statements made by
the accused” upon defense counsel’s written motion); ky. rCr. 7.24(1)(a)
(obligating the commonwealth to disclose “the substance, including time,
date, and place, of any oral incriminating statement . . . to have been made
by a defendant to any witness” upon his or her written request, as well as to
permit the defendant to inspect and copy any relevant “written or recorded
statements or confessions made by the defendant . . . that are known by the
attorney for the Commonwealth to be in the possession, custody, or control
of the Commonwealth . . .”); ohio Crim. r. 16(B) (ordering disclosure upon
written request of “[a]ny written or recorded statement by the defendant . . .
including police summaries of such statements, and including grand jury
testimony by . . . the defendant . . .”); r.i, sUPer. r. Crim. 16(a)(1) (requiring state, upon written request, to disclose “all relevant written or recorded
statements or confessions, signed or unsigned, or written summaries of oral
statements or confessions made by the defendant, or copies thereof . . .”);
tenn. r. Crim. P. 16(a) (instructing the state, upon request, to disclose “the
substance of any of the defendant’s oral statements made before or after
arrest in response to interrogation by any person the defendant knew was
a law-enforcement officer if the state intends to offer the statement in evidence at trial,” as well as defendant’s written or recorded statements within
the state’s control of which the state’s attorney is aware); vt. r. Crim. P.
16(a)(2)(A) (requiring disclosure of “any written or recorded statements
and the substance of any oral statements made by the defendant . . .”).
1
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See fed. r. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(B); see also United States v. Brown, 345
F. Supp. 2d 358, 359 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“Other than exculpatory evidence,
the Government is not required by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
16 to provide a defendant with advance notice of any statements that it
intends to offer into evidence, unless the defendant made a request for such
information.”).
4
fed. r. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(B).
5
Id.
6
fed. r. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(B)(2).
7
Id.
8
See United States v. Caldwell, 543 F.2d 1333, 1352 n.93 (D.C. Cir.
1974) (noting “as applied to the accused’s own damaging statements, the
requirement of relevance ‘seems superfluous in view of the obviously vital
importance of the material sought.’”); id. (quoting 8 J. moore, federal
PraCtiCe ¶ 16.05[1], at 16-32 (2d ed. 1965)).
9
Caldwell, 543 F.2d at 1353.
10
fed. r. Crim. P. 16 advisory committee’s note, 1974 Amendment
(“Rule 16 is revised to give greater discovery to both the prosecution
and the defense. Subdivision (a) deals with disclosure of evidence by the
government. Subdivision (b) deals with disclosure of evidence by the
defendant. The majority of the Advisory Committee is of the view that the
two--prosecution and defense discovery--are related and that the giving of
a broader right of discovery to the defense is dependent upon giving also a
broader right of discovery to the prosecution.”).
11
Inevitably, this practice prejudices not only the defense but also the
prosecution. Any incentive to forego preservation of a witness’s statements
may ultimately hinder the prosecution’s ability to refresh the witness’s
recollection, cabin the witness’s statements to those which the government
can verify and corroborate, and transfer the case to another prosecutor who
may not have knowledge of unrecorded oral statements allegedly attributed
to the accused.
12
fed. r. Crim. P. 2 requires all federal criminal procedural rules to be
“interpreted to provide for the just determination of every criminal proceeding, to secure simplicity in procedure and fairness in administration,
and to eliminate unjustifiable expense and delay.” Id.
13
See United States v. Rosenfeld, 57 F.2d 74, 76-77 (2d Cir. 1932)
(expressing doubt whether discovery rights in civil cases “could be
stretched to cover criminal proceedings.”).
14
See Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977) (concluding that
“[t]here is no constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case . . .”).
15
See United States v. B. Goedde & Co., 40 F. Supp. 523, 534 (E.D. Ill.
1941) (allowing defendant access to and examination of her own documents before trial).
16
fed. r. Crim. P. 16 advisory committee’s note, 1944 Adoption.
17
New Jersey v. Tune, 98 A.2d 881, 893 (N.J. 1953).
18
Courts, however, on occasion authorized disclosure of an accused’s own
grand jury testimony upon a showing of either “compelling circumstances”
or “particularized need.” United States v. Johnson, 215 F. Supp. 300, 318
(D. Md. 1963) (ruling that one congressman was not entitled to disclosure
of his own grand jury testimony because he failed to make the requisite
showing, whereas other congressman’s “poor physical condition at the
time he testified [was] supported not only by his own affidavit but by the
certificate of the attending physician to the Congress,” thus demonstrating
“a particularized need . . .”).
19
fed. r. Crim. P. 16 advisory committee’s note, 1966 Amendment.
(“The court is authorized to order the attorney for the government to permit
the defendant to inspect and copy or photograph three different types of
material: [r]elevant written or recorded statements or confessions made by
the defendant, or copies thereof” and “[t]he policy which favors pretrial
disclosure to a defendant of his statements to government agents also
supports, pretrial disclosure of his testimony before a grand jury.”).
20
fed. r. Crim. P. 16.
3
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fed. r. Crim. P. 16 (a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(3).
fed. r. Crim. P. 16.
23
See id. (citing eleven articles on the subject).
24
See id. (quoting Cicenia v. Lagay, 357 U.S. 504, 511 (1958)). The
Advisory Committee identified the following states as requiring disclosure:
Delaware, Illinois, Maryland, Arizona, California, Louisiana, Michigan,
Mississippi, New Jersey, and New York.
25
New Jersey v. Tune, 98 A.2d 881 (N.J. 1953).
26
New Jersey v. Johnson, 145 A.2d 313 (N.J. 1958).
27
New Jersey v. Murphy, 175 A.2d 622 (N.J. 1961).
28
New Jersey v. Moffa, 176 A.2d 1 (N.J. 1961).
29
Tune, 98 A.2d at 887.
30
Id. at 892.
31
Id. at 891.
32
Id.
33
See id. at 892 (noting some courts retain this requirement); see also
Kreuter v. United States, 376 F.2d 654, 657 (10th Cir. 1967) (affirming
denial of defendant’s request for disclosure of all statements he made to
government agents where affidavit in support of the motion only stated
defendant was unable to remember his oral statement); United States v.
Boone, No. 02-CR-1185, 2003 WL 21488021, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. June 27,
2003) (concluding that defendant’s discovery request for all statements
reduced to writing by police and made by him in debriefing session at
police station prior to Miranda warnings was not supported by defendant’s
own affidavit and thus must be denied); Cash v. Superior Court of Santa
Clara Cnty., 346 P.2d 407, 409 (Cal. 1959) (allowing defendant to inspect
and copy recordings or transcriptions of his statements made to an undercover officer upon a showing, supported by affidavit, that court should
grant the request in the interest of a fair trial); Kreuter v. United States, 376
F.2d 654, 657 (10th Cir. 1967) (affirming denial of defendant’s request for
disclosure of all statements he made to government agents where affidavit
in support of the motion only stated defendant was unable to remember his
oral statement)
34
See New Jersey v. Tune, 98 A.2d 881, 866 (N.J. 1953) (quoting United
States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923)). As the Tune majority
noted, Judge Hand’s elevation to the Second Circuit did nothing to temper
his views: “The defendants seem to suppose that they had the privilege of
roaming about at will among any memoranda made by the prosecution in
preparation for trial: that indeed is not an uncommon illusion, but it has
nothing whatever to support it.” Id. (quoting United States v. Dilliard, 101
F.2d 829, 837 (2d Cir. 1938)).
35
Id.
36
See id. at 889 (commenting that the Tune court rejected the defense’s
invitation to look across the pond for judicial guidance, because although
England allowed “full discovery in criminal matters,” it relied upon a
system of private prosecution of crimes, had a far more advanced system
of crime detection and investigation, and “the law-abiding instincts of the
[English] population are in marked contrast to the disrespect for the law
which has long characterized the American frontier and which has not yet
disappeared as the criminal statistics indicate in certain segments of the
population.”).
37
Id. at 893.
38
Id. at 884.
39
New Jersey v. Tune, 98 A.2d 881, 892 (N.J. 1953).
40
Id. at 894 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
41
Id. at 896-97.
42
See New Jersey v. Johnson, 145 A.2d 313, 315 (N.J. 1958) (citing
Decisions, Pre-Trial Discovery of Criminal Defendant’s Confession, 53
ColUm. l. rev. 1161, 1163 (1953); Criminal Procedure-Discovery of
Defendant’s Confession, 29 n.y.U. l. rev. 1140, 1141-42 (1954); Recent
Decisions, Pretrial Inspection of Confession Held Denied Where He Failed
to Show Justice Required Such Discovery, 39 va. l. rev. 976, 977 (1953)).
21
22
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As one commentator observed in reviewing Tune: “If the trial court’s order
was an abuse of discretion in this case, it is difficult to conjure a fact situation where a New Jersey judge could, in the exercise of his discretion, allow
inspection of an accused’s confession.” Id.
43
Johnson, 145 A.2d at 315.
44
Id.
45
Id. at 316.
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
New Jersey v. Johnson, 145 A.2d 313, 318 (N.J. 1958).
49
In 1963, the Institute of Judicial Administration at New York University
Law School proposed to the ABA that it formulate minimum standards
in the field of criminal justice, building upon a similar project that had
occurred twenty-five years earlier. In early 1964, the Institute conducted a
pilot study led by a committee headed by Chief Judge J. Edward Lumbard
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The committee
authorized a three-year project focused on “the entire spectrum of the
administration of criminal justice, including the functions performed by
law enforcement officers, by prosecutors and by defense counsel, and the
procedures to be followed in the pretrial, trial, sentencing and review
stages.” aBa ProJeCt on minimUm standards for Criminal JUstiCe,
standards relating to disCovery and ProCedUre Before trial i,
at vi (Tentative Draft, 1969) [hereinafter aBa ProJeCt for minimUm
standards]. Pre-trial discovery and pre-trial procedures were combined in
a single study because of their interrelation. Id. at vii.
50
fed. r. Crim. P. 16 advisory committee’s note, 1974 Amendment.
51
aBa ProJeCt for minimUm standards, supra note 49, at 1.
52
Id. at 1-2.
53
Id. at 2.
54
Id. 2-3.
55
Id. at 34.
56
aBa ProJeCt for minimUm standards, supra note 49, at 40.
57
See id. at 43, 45 (rejecting reciprocal disclosure based on threat of
“perjury or intimidation of witnesses” or on the notion that the “accused has
every advantage” due to the government’s burden of proving guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt and the prohibition against inferring guilt from the
accused’s decision not to testify).
58
fed. r. Crim. P. 16, advisory committee’s note, 1974 Amendment.
59
Id.
60
Id. This Article does not address the constitutionality of requiring
criminal defendants to provide discovery that may later be used against
them. It focuses, instead, on the absence of a reasonable justification for
denying a criminal defendant access to all of his or her allegedly incriminating statements, regardless of whether they are oral, written, or recorded,
and regardless of to whom and in what circumstances they were made.
61
The 1975 version of Rule 16(a) as enacted provided:
Upon request of a defendant the government shall permit the defendant
to inspect and copy or photograph: any relevant written or recorded statements made by the defendant, or copies thereof, within the possession,
custody or control of the government, the existence of which is known, or
by the exercise of due diligence may become known, to the attorney for
the government; the substance of any oral statement which the government
intends to offer in evidence at the trial made by the defendant whether
before or after arrest in response to interrogation by any person then known
to the defendant to be a government agent; and recorded testimony of the
defendant before a grand jury which relates to the offense charged.
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Amendments Act of 1975, Pub. L.
No. 94-64, § 3, 89 Stat. 370, 28 (1975).
62
fed. r. Crim. P. 16 advisory committee’s note, 1974 Amendment.
63
Id. (citing Cicenia v. Lagay, 357 U.S. 504, 511 (1958)).
64
Id.
65
As the Advisory Committee explained, the revised rule:
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[E]nlarges the right of government discovery in several ways: (1) it gives
the government the right to discovery of lists of defense witnesses as
well as physical evidence and the results of examinations and tests; (2) it
requires disclosure if the defendant has the evidence under his control and
intends to use it at trial in his case in chief, without the additional burden,
required by the old rule, of having to show, in behalf of the government,
that the evidence is material and the request is reasonable; and (3) it gives
the government the right to discovery without conditioning that right upon
the existence of a prior request for discovery by the defendant.
fed. r. Crim. P. 16, advisory committee’s note, 1974 Amendment.
66
fed. r. Crim. P. 16 advisory committee’s note, 1991 Amendment (“The
rule now requires the prosecution, upon request, to disclose any written
record which contains reference to a relevant oral statement by the defendant which in response to an interrogation, without regard to whether the
prosecution intends to use the statement at trial.”).
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
fed. r. Crim. P. 16 advisory committee’s note, 1994 Amendment
(“The amendment is intended to clarify that the discovery and disclosure
requirements of the rule apply equally to individual and organizational
defendants.”).
71
Id.
72
fed. r. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(A-B).
73
In this context, “relevancy” is typically defined in accordance with fed.
r. evid. 401 to mean “evidence having any tendency to make the existence
of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” See
United States v. Stevens, 985 F.2d 1175, 1180 (2d Cir. 1993) (relevance
is to be interpreted broadly so that the rule gives a “defendant virtually
an absolute right to his own recorded statements in the absence of highly
unusual circumstances that would otherwise justify a protective order.”)
(citing 2 Charles alan Wright, federal PraCtiCe and ProCedUre § 253,
46-47 (1st ed. 1982)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 8 J.
moore, federal PraCtiCe ¶ 16.05[1], at 16-32 (2d ed. 1965) (as applied
to the accused’s own damaging statements, the requirement of relevance
“seems superfluous in view of the vital importance of the material sought.”).
74
fed. r. Crim. P. 16(a).
75
fed. r. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(A).
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
According to Rule 16(a)’s plain language, the disclosure requirement
pertains only to oral statements made “before or after arrest[.]” fed. r.
Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(A); see also Smith v. United States, 285 F. App’x. 209,
211-12, 214 (6th Cir. 2008) (even though the court found “incredible”
police officer’s trial testimony that defendant made an oral statement that
she received gun “from her supplier” which officer thereafter failed to
record, circuit court found statement was not made in response to functional equivalent of interrogation but was a statement “normally attendant
to arrest and custody” and thus was not subject to Rule 16(a) disclosure)
(quoting Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980)).
80
fed. r. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(A).
81
Id.
82
This requirement alone provides fertile grounds for non-disclosure
regardless of the statement’s materiality and its use at trial. It also provides
ample grounds for a factual dispute regarding what an accused knew. See
e.g United States v. Siraj, 533 F.3d 99, 101-02 (2d Cir. 2008), (exemplifying
in a case of first impression, the Second Circuit ruled that written police
reports that memorialize oral statements made by a defendant to an undercover officer need not be produced where the defendant was unaware of
the government agent’s status at the time of making the statement); United
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States v. Tavarez, 518 F. Supp. 2d 600, 603 (S.D.N.Y. 2007), (noting that
the defendant asked the government to provide the date, time, place, and
circumstances that the government’s complaint alleged that the defendant
made a statement to a confidential source, as well as any written summaries
of that statement. The court rejected the request without analysis, noting
that the Second Circuit did not require disclosure of oral statements made to
individuals who were, but who were not known to be, government agents).
Id. (citing In re United States, 834 F.2d 283, 284-86 (2d Cir. 1987)); see
also United States v. Taylor, 417 F.3d 1176, 1181-82 (11th Cir. 2005)
(ruling criminal defendant was not entitled to disclosure of his alleged
jailhouse confession to the charged offenses because it was not made to a
government agent even though the government was aware of the alleged
confession six months before the start of trial and called the federal prisoner
to whom it was made as a witness at trial); United States v. Singleton, 53
F. App’x. 384, 385 (7th Cir. 2002) (noting the government is not required
to disclose defendant’s statement that he could also sell her crack cocaine
to undercover officer during a cocaine sale, because he did not know at the
time that officer was a government agent); United States v. Johnson, 562
F.2d 515, 518 (8th Cir. 1977) (finding no Rule 16 violation where no interrogation took place and government agent did not identify himself as such).
83
fed. r. Crim. P. 16(a).
84
Id.
85
Neither the House Report nor the House Conference Report accompanying the amendments explain why disclosure was limited to only those
oral statements made in response to interrogation [by] a person known to
be a government agent. Two representatives objected, stating that ‘[t]here
is no justification for this limitation: the defendant should be able to obtain
any statement he made if the government intends to use it at trial.’
United States v. Hoffman, 794 F.2d 1429, 1431 n.3 (9th Cir. 1986)
(citing § 3, 89 Stat. at 36 (separate views of Ms. Holtzman and Mr. Drinan)
(emphasis in original)).
86
See United States v. Griggs, 111 F. Supp. 2d 551, 553-554 (M.D. Pa.
2000) (specifying that an “agent” must be either employed by a federal
entity, acting on behalf of a federal entity, or allied with prosecution
once a federal investigation or prosecution begins and finding that State
Police Troopers were not “government agents”); see also United States
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